8. GOVERNMENT SECRECY MAKES A MOCKERY OF DEMOCRACY
Source: Issues In Science and Technology, 307 Massachusetts Avenue,
NE Washington, DC 20002, Date: Summer 1992, Title: "The Perils
of Government Secrecy," Author: Steven Aftergood
SYNOPSIS: In 1991 some 6,500 U.S. government employees classified
7,107,017 documents, an average of more than 19,000 documents per day.
Steven Aftergood, a senior research analyst at the Federation of American
Scientists (FAS) in Washington, DC, says our information policy is in
disarray, with widespread over-classification and an inefficient and
costly information system. Further, the classified files are overflowing
with records of policy decisions, historical and budget documents, and
reams of environmental data that could not possibly compromise our national
security. Some examples:
Secret historical documents: As of last year, the oldest classified
military document in the National Archives was dated April 15, 1917,
and concerns U.S. troop movements in Europe during World War I. National
Security Directives (NSD): These secret presidential directives withhold
basic policy documents concerning space, telecommunications, counter-narcotics,
etc., from Congress as well as the public. Until May 1992, not a single
Bush administration NSD had ever been made public; at that time, President
Bush, under pressure, partially declassified his directive concerning
U.S. policy on Iraq.
The Black Budget: About 15 percent of the Defense Department's
budget for weapons acquisition has been classified in recent years,
keeping the cost of a program, its purpose, even its existence a secret
from Congress. Often the excessive secrecy leads to abuse involving
program failures, cost overruns and fraud.
Secret environmental impact data: The Department of Energy
has withheld data on the health effects of its nuclear weapons production
facilities. No matter how potentially dangerous a proposed project
may be to the public, information about its hazards can be concealed.
Intelligence information: There are more than a dozen intelligence
agencies within the government, including the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO), responsible for satellite reconnaissance. Ironically,
the very name and existence of the NRO are classified. Further, the
combined budget for these agencies is secret because it is felt that
official disclosure of such a number, estimated to be about $30 billion
a year, would jeopardize American agents or sensitive technologies.
Concerned with an ever-increasing criticism of its secrecy, the CIA
last year prepared a report on how the agency might achieve greater
openness -- and then classified the report.
While governments require some degree of secrecy, it was only with
the start of the Cold War that it went beyond military information and
became an institutionalized part of the U.S. bureaucracy. In 1951, President
Truman established a classification system that included civilian as
well as military agencies. The system has been revised a number of times
since and reached a peak of openness under the Carter administration.
This trend toward openness was reversed by President Reagan, who, in
1983, issued an executive order that said, in essence, when in doubt,
classify. And if there is a question of what level of classification,
the higher level is to be adopted. Now the system is totally out of
As Aftergood concludes, "Openness in government is not a threat
to national security ... it is the foundation of the nation's political
way of life and the source of much of its strength."
SSU Censored Researcher: Kimberly S Anderson
COMMENTS: The millions of documents now being classified annually,
as author Steven Aftergood points out, can be traced to Friday, March
11, 1983, when President Ronald Reagan issued an executive order to
"stem the flow of leaks of classified government information."
At the time, Anthony Lewis, columnist with the New York Times, warned
that this was "the most dangerous executive order in many years:
dangerous to the American system of democratic control over public policy.
It is also, so far, dangerously misunderstood."
Aftergood offers some further points: "Considering its importance
in determining the boundaries of permitted public knowledge, the government
secrecy system has not been closely scrutinized or even widely recognized.
"Even when the news media report the eruption of scandals such
as Iraqgate, they have rarely stopped to examine the structural factors
that make such scandals possible. One of these factors is certainly
the arbitrary exercise of classi-fication authority, which all too often
allows political misconduct to be concealed in the name of national
"Wider exposure of the systemic abuse of government secrecy would
finally make it politically possible to reform the secrecy system and
to challenge it when warranted. Government officials quite naturally
tend to conceal information they deem sensitive. It is incumbent on
an informed electorate to assert its right to know and to demand government
accountability. The necessary first step is to acknowledge the problem.
"It is hard to say that anyone benefits by ignoring the explosive
growth of government secrecy, except of course those who have secrets
they wish to maintain. But if there is in fact a core body of information
that truly must be protected in the interests of national security,
as I believe, then that information too may become less secure when
classification authority is invoked for bureaucratic or political advantage,
and the credibility of the classification system declines.
"It is easier to say who is harmed by ignoring secrecy, and that
is almost everyone, to some degree. Excessive secrecy has not only become
a hindrance in science and technology, it has infected much of government
information policy, frustrating public debate on a range of crucial
subjects from foreign policy to the environment, and subverting the
operation of our political institutions."
Aftergood also has a tip for the Clinton administration:
"Since the national security classification system is based on
Executive Order, not statutory law, it can be unilaterally altered by
the president. One may hope that the Clinton administration will finally
see fit to reverse at least some of the abuses of the Cold War secrecy
system, and especially the excesses of the Reagan/Bush years."